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THE ROLE OF LAW IN LABOR DISPUTESt
Archibald Cox*
In the midst of debate on amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, there
is a strong temptation to discuss whether secondary boycotts, juris-
dictional strikes or organizational picketings are "good" or "bad"; and
if they are bad, to say the law should prohibit them. If one law does
not solve the problem, a stronger law must be enacted. Legislators
frequently succumb to the temptation. It is all too evident in judicial
opinions. Judging by my own occasional testimony before legislative
committees, the disease infects even academicians. The best antidote
is to force ourselves every now and then to lay aside even the most
pressing specific problem and think in terms of general principle without
immediate, specific application.
One basic question is whether there are not marked limitations on
the usefulness of law that ought to be taken into account more explicitly
and be given more weight both in revising labor legislation and in
reaching judicial decisions. Which problems can be solved by law?
Which are not amenable to legal resolution? How can one group be
separated from the other? Such questions are pertinent over the whole
range of labor legislation, but in the field of labor disputes, especially
strikes and picketing, we have had the greatest experience and at the
risk of threshing out old straw can hope to draw some lessons from
history.
I
During the latter part of the nineteenth century the rising power of
labor organizations made it necessary to develop a public labor policy,
at first for solving the immediate problems of labor disputes, but
ultimately for curing the underlying social and economic distress. For
half a century or more the national labor policy was formulated by
the judiciary. The labor injunction involved government intervention
into industrial relations no less than statutes and administrative agencies,
for the courts are a branch of government. In the labor movement
this first phase in the development of labor law left a legacy of deep
hatred for the word "injunction" and of distrust for law except as a
t This article is the text of an address delivered by Professor Cox at the Cornell Con-
ference on "Current Problems in Labor Relations and Arbitration," sponsored by the New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, in Ithaca,
New York, on April 13th and 14th, 1954.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 690, for biographical data.
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weapon in the struggle for power. To the law there was also bequeathed
the slippery doctrine that concerted action by employees may be enjoined
at the suit of the employer unless the employees are pursuing lawful
objectives by lawful means.'
The formula is plausible enough; labor unions should not be privileged
to pursue "unlawful objectives" or to resort to "unlawful means." The
fault is that "unlawful" is used sometimes with its normal connotation
and sometimes in a highly Pickwickian sense. If the Operating Engineers
refused to furnish men to a highway contractor until the contractor
agreed to enter into a conspiracy to rig all bids on State construction
projects, the objective would be unlawful because the union was de-
manding the commission of a criminal offense.2 A union which pickets
a business establishment for the purpose of inducing the owner to grant
it exclusive recognition as bargaining representative in violation of a
Labor Board certification has an unlawful objective because it is seeking
to accomplish that which the law forbids.' But what about the union
which called a strike to secure a closed shop agreement? At common
law employers and unions could lawfully make such agreements and,
once made, the courts would enforce them. Oddly enough, however,
a strike for the closed shop was forbidden because the objective was
"unlawful." 4 In this context the word meant only that the judges had
concluded that the desire to spread union organization through the
closed shop was not a sufficient reason for injuring the employer's
business. Whether it should have been regarded as adequate is quite
beside the point. Only muddled thinking can result from using the
term "unlawful" to cover two such different kinds of cases. The
substantial differences between (1) concerted activities intended to
induce unlawful conduct and (2) concerted activities whose purpose
is permissible but unimportant raise sufficient likelihood of different
legal consequences so that one concept ought not to cover both. The
point requires emphasis because the misleading use of the term "un-
lawful objective" still plagues labor law in ways presently to be con-
sidered.
By 1930 most students of labor law and labor relations thought
1 Restatement, Torts § 775 (1939).
2 E.g., Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939).
3 E.g., Markham & Callow, Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517,
135 P.2d 727 (1943).
4 A strike for a closed shop has, accordingly, been held a strike for an unlawful
purpose.... On the other hand, agreements voluntarily made between an employer
and a union calling for a closed shop have always been recognized and enforced in
this Commonwealth.
Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 388, 48 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1943).
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that the evils of the labor injunction had been proved beyond dispute.
The procedural shortcomings need not delay us-the ex parte restrain-
ing orders, the long delays, the legalistic verbiage of court decrees, the
trial of simple breaches of the peace before an equity judge instead of
a jury-for these faults do not go so much to the usefulness of law
as to -the methods of the judicial administration.5 The substantive
criticisms require closer attention.
One criticism was that the judges ought not to be deciding large
social and economic issues according to their individual or collective
predilections. The sharpest accusation was that the courts had one law
for business combinations but another for labor unions. The charge was
not implausible. When a number of employment agencies agreed to
drive their competitors out of business by refusing to furnish seamen
to any vessel whose owner did not deal exclusively with members of
the combination, the court upheld the combination in the name of fair
competition; 6 but when a labor union refused to furnish men to a
contractor unless he agreed to hire all his employees through the union,
the same court issued an injunction.7 Other decisions seemed to display
a lack of understanding of elementary economics. When the United
Mine Workers, who had established a union wage scale in Pennsylvania
and Ohio, 'sought to organize the non-union mines in the West Virginia
panhandle, the Supreme Court declared that the union could have no
interest in labor standards in non-union mines, completely ignoring the
effect of the low cost coal upon the entire market.8 Even if such decisions
were sound policy, the failure to take account of practical economic
conditions reduced their acceptability. In any event, what business had
judges to decide these questions? If a strike against technological in-
novation was forbidden in 'Massachusetts9 but permitted in Minnesota, °
if unions could lawfully engage in organizational picketing in New York 1
but not in Ohio,' 2 were the judges applying rules of law or issuing
personal edicts? Whence did the courts derive authority to make law
upon such questions?
5 The classic discussion is Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
6 Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867).
7 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
8 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). See also AIco-Zander Co.
v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
9 Haverhill Strand Theatre v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918).
10 Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians Ass'n, 118 Minn. 410, 136
N.W. 1092 (1912).
11 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
12 Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio 352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1939).
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A second criticism was that injunctions were essentially repressive in
the sense that they required the employees to desist from using the
most effective form of self-help but did nothing to solve the underlying
problems that drove men first to organize and then to strike. The
Hitchman injunction thwarted the United Mine Workers but did not
improve the lot of the miners.13 The famous Debs injunction may have
checked the nationwide spread of economic paralysis, 4 but the Pullman
workers were left to suffer in the squeeze between successive wage cuts
and the constant rents and prices in the company village. 5 In the long
run pressing problems require solution. The labor injunction was
society's way of emulating the ostrich by sticking its head in the sand.
Third, one should note the difficulties attendant upon the enforcement
of an injunction in a labor dispute. I remember one case in which a
client asked my senior to obtain an injunction against an unlawful
strike. The law was plainly on our side, but we had misgivings about
the practical consequences. The client was most insistent, however,
until my senior asked him what he wished done if the employees dis-
obeyed the injunction. Should the workers be fined or put in jail? The
client said, "No"; he planned to keep on living in that community.
Should the leaders be jailed for contempt? Heavens no, that would
only make martyrs of them. How about a good stiff fine? No, said
the client, if they don't pay the fine or even if they do, they'll become
martyrs. My senior pointed out that there was no other legal recourse
and asked again how he should handle the problem. After a pause the
client said that he did not want an injunction.
The repudiation of the labor injunction in the nineteen thirties cannot
be explained by these criticisms alone. Probably the single most im-
portant factor was a rising belief in union organization and collective
bargaining, which swept aside the existing law simply because it was
an obstacle. But the criticisms ought to have raised lasting doubts
concerning the usefulness of law in labor disputes.
For a time the general distrust of law in labor relations went beyond
mere doubt. During the short, second phase in the history of modern
labor law, which was ushered in by the enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932,16 the prevailing view held that the law served
no useful purpose in labor relations save possibly to preserve public
order. Within the wide circle of persons interested or participating in
13 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 299 (1917).
14 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
15 U.S. Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike (1894).
16 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1946).
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a labor dispute it became lawful to resort to any peaceful measures of
self-help without regard to their objective. This was laissez faire par
excellence. The labor injunction meant government intervention into
labor disputes. The anti-injunction laws freed dog to eat dog; the
strong would survive and- the weak would go under. If an employer
opposed unionization by threats, industrial espionage, discriminatory
discharges and the blacklist, the employees might counterattack by
strikes and boycotts. If the employees formed a union in an establish-
ment over which another labor organization claimed jurisdiction, the
two should fight it out with any peaceful weapon.17 If the latter union
held an economic stranglehold on the business, the sacrifice of employee
free will and the employer's business losses were the price of free
competition.
The period in which the law was assigned no role in labor relations
ended almost as soon as it began. The Wagner Act'8 became'law only
three years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Its enactment marked the
return of law, albeit on the other side of the struggle. At first the
National Labor Relations Act was confined to the organizational phase
of labor relations. None of its provisions expressly restricted strikes or
picketing. Section 7 guaranteed the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities. Section 13 preserved the right to strike. Within a
few years after enactment, a basic inconsistency appeared between the
legal duties imposed by the Wagner Act and the Norris-LaGuardia thesis
that the law has no role to play in labor disputes.
The inconsistency was sharply revealed in Floresheim Shoe Store Co.
v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union.'9 After rival organizational campaigns,
A.F.L. won an election over C.I.O. and was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative by the State Labor Relations Board. C.I.O.
continued to picket the shoe stores for the purpose of compelling
Floresheim to bargain with it in plain violation of the statutory duty
to accord A.F.L. exclusive recognition. Despite the baby Norris-
LaGuardia Act20 the picketing was held enjoinable on the ground that
the labor dispute had been ended by the certification of A.F.L. The
good sense of the decision is beyond dispute. It would be an outrage
for the law to impose on an employer a legal duty to bargain with
one union while it simultaneously withheld legal assistance against
another union which was destroying his business because he followed
17 E.g., Fur Workers Union, Local 72 v. Fur Workers Union No. 21238, 105 F.2d I
(D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 522 (1939).
18 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946).
19 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E.2d 480 (1944).
20 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876a.
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the legal mandate. Arguably the court should have waited for legislative
action, as the Supreme Court waited for the Taft-Hartley amendments
to remove the corresponding federal anomaly; 21 but the argument gives
insufficient weight to the traditional judicial function of meshing incon-
sistent statutes into a coherent body of law.
Unfortunately the Floresheim case gave birth to ill-considered progeny.
The C.I.O. objective was "unlawful" in the sense that the union was
seeking to compel the commission of an unfair labor practice. Other
judges took this to mean that there was no labor dispute where a union
called a strike or engaged in picketing in pursuit of any "unlawful
objective." That slippery concept, which we have analyzed already,22
served as a bridge to the cases in which the union's objective was
unlawful only in the sense that the judge considered it an insufficient
justification for concerted activities.2 3 The fallacy, now imbedded deeply
in New York opinions, opened the door to revival of the labor injunction
in a wide variety of situations. Picketing for recognition is widely
enjoined. 4 So are concerted activities supporting union demands which,
in the judgment of the court, invade management's prerogatives. It
has been held, for example, that picketing intended to influence the
location of a dress shop is unlawful.25 Another court held it had juris-
diction to enjoin a strike to secure the reinstatement of a discharged
employee solely upon the ground that this was an unlawful labor
objective.28
The imposition of legal obligations in labor relations under the
Wagner Act restored the law to a place in labor disputes and stimulated
judicial erosion of the anti-injunction acts through the objectives test.
In the main, however, the revival of the labor injunction was a response
to deeper causes: distrust of the growing power of a few unions; resent-
ment toward labor's claim of immunity from regulation; the feeling that
21 United States v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
22 See p. 593 supra.
23 E.g., Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941); Schwab v.
Moving Picture Operators Local No. 159, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941).
24 E.g., Postma v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 334 Mich. 347, 54 N.W.2d
681 (1952); Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner, 249 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1952); Tallman Co. v. Latal,
25 CCH Lab. Cas. f[ 68,207 (Mo. 1954); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101
N.E.2d 697 (1951).
25 G.H. & Freyberg Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers, 24 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 68,098 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. Huron Stevedoring Co. v. Grogan, 24 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 67,972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953); Mittman & Co. v. Huchstadt, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 100 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1952).
26 Sound Ship Building Corp. v. Sullivan, 23 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 67,574 (1953); cf.
National Shoes Inc. v. Lawson, 27 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Labor Management) 2247 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1951).
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act, had gone too' far in freeing even the most
undesirable strikes and boycotts from legal restriction. Whatever the
motivation, the path cut by the pendulum's swing was both wide and
deep. -Several States attempted to outlaw picketing except by employees
of the employer." Others forbade all organizational picketing either by
statute 8 or judicial decision. And, as is well known, the Taft-Hartley
amendments introduced federal restrictions on four kinds of concerted
activities:
(1) violence and intimidation; 0
(2) secondary boycotts; i.e., the refusal to work for employer A
unless he ceases to do business with employer B, with whom the union
has its real dispute;"'
(3) strikes to compel an employer to commit some unfair labor prac-
tice such as discharging an employee for belonging (or not belonging) to
a particular union," or bargaining with the striking union after the
NLRB has certified a different representative; 33
(4) jurisdictional strikes over work assignments.3 4
Although the President recommended slight relaxation of some of
these restrictions5 and the Senate Committee on Education and Labor
reported legislation to implement his message,36 the general trend of
the law, both in legislation and in judicial opinions, is still toward in-
creasing legal intervention in labor disputes. Witness the vote in House
Committee on Education and Labor to amend the NLRA to forbid all
strikes or: picketing by an uncertified 'union. Consider also the ever-
27 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 211 (Purdon i941) as amended by Pa. Laws 1947, No. 484; Va.
Laws 1946, c. 229. These statutes have been largely ineffective because of the decision
in AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), which cast grave doubt upon their constitutionality.
28 Ore.. Comp. Laws Ann. § 662.770. The provision was held unconstitutional by the
trial court in Scherer v. Culinary Alliance and Bartenders' Union, 25 CCH Lab. Cas.
68,152 (1954).
29 Tallman Co. v. Latali 25 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 68,207 (Mo. 1954); Matson Navigation
Co. v. Brotherhood of Marine Engineers, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. J 67,057 (Pa. C. P. 1952).
In, New York most judges appear to be distinguishing between picketing for recognition,
which is enjoined, and organizational picketing which is permitted. E.g., Palermo v. Motto,
25 CCH Lab. Cas. f1 68,173 (2d Dep't 1954); Cricchio v. Horowitz, 24 CCH Lab. Cas.
I9 68,008 (Sup. Ct, 1953). But other cases blur the distinction: Wood v. O'Grady, 24
CCH Lab. Cas. ff 68,021 (1st Dep't 1953); Bickford's Inc. v. Mesevich, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 369
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952).
30 61 Stat. 136 § 8(b)(1)(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 148 (Supp. 1952) (Taft-Hartley Act).
3' Ibid., § 8(b) (4) (A) and (B).
32 Ibid., § 8(b)(2).
33 Ibid., § 8(b) (4) (C).
34 Ibid., § 8(b)(4)(D).
35 H.R.Doc. No. 291 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
36 Sen. Rep. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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increasing judicial restraints imposed by the New York courts, in
disregard of the earlier opinions of Chief Judges Cardozo and Lehman.
31
IT
The current of events raises more general questions than whether
to forbid particular kinds of strikes. Was there no validity to the sub-
stantive criticisms of the labor injunction which gained acceptance
twenty years ago? Were they valid while the labor movement was weak
but inapplicable under current conditions? Or are we simply repeating
the ancient error of forgetting lessons not learned from personal ex-
perience and therefore overlooking fundamental limitations on the
usefulness of law in labor disputes?
One limitation, I suggest, results from the necessity of framing re-
strictions on concerted activities in terms of their objective. When a
union is forbidden to put economic pressure on an employer for a
specified purpose but is left free to strike for other purposes, the law
accomplishes little more than to put a premium on subterfuge. In
Massachusetts it was formerly unlawful to strike for a union shop.
38
There were few strikes for that purpose, but in collective bargaining
negotiations it was extraordinarily difficult to settle wage questions until
the issue of unionsecurity was resolved. Strikes for a ten cents an hour
wage increase were often settled for five cents plus the union shop.
Another illustration is furnished by the featherbedding cases decided
last year by the United States Supreme Court. 9 The American Federa-
tion of Musicians had sometimes required movie theatres or night club
operators to pay local musicians for standing by whenever a traveling
name band played an engagement. NLRA Section 8(b) (6) forbade the
practice by making it unfair for a labor organization-
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay .. .for services which
are not performed or not to be performed.
AFM thereupon shifted its method of protecting local musicians. It
refused to permit name bands to play unless the local musicians played
overtures or during intermissions. The Supreme Court held that this
practice did not violate the statute.40 Perhaps a statute could be written
37 An exhaustive and acute analysis is Schlesinger, A Summary and Critique of the Law
of Picketing in New York (1953).
38 Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943). Mass. Acts 1950,
c. 452, legalized this type of concerted activity.
39 American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); NLRB v.
Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953). See Note 39 Cornell L.Q. 128 (1953).
40 NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., supra note 39.
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to catch up with the union, but not without risk of projecting the
government into the determination of what work should be done.41
This is one of the faults in the present case law with respect to the
use of picketing as a technique of union organization. When the old
rules forbidding stranger picketing were broken down,42 it seemed
likely that most industrial States would permit strikes and picketing as
methods for achieving organization and winning bargaining rights.
But often the union prefaces the concerted activities with a request for
recognition and the execution of a contract, neither of which the em-
ployer can grant without committing an unfair labor practice. The
courts, with considerable logic, reasoned that the law could not fairly
forbid the employer to grant recognition and still leave his business
at the mercy of the pickets; the objective was therefore held unlawful
and the picketing was enjoined.4" Some union lawyers were smart
enough to advise their clients not to make demands upon the employer
until the union had induced a majority of the employees to become
members. "Engage in educational picketing," they said, "or if you
must admit that picketing imposes economic pressure, say that you are
pressuring the employees and want a contract only after you have
achieved majority status." Where the union follows this advice,
the legal reasoning that condemns picketing for immediate recognition
breaks down. The objective is not unlawful-in the first sense of the
term-and some courts, including at least one department of the Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court, hold that an injunction
will not issue to restrain the organizational picketing.44 In this state of
affairs should we not ask what has been accomplished by the law's
forbidding picketing in support of the demand for recognition? Legal
logic has received due obeisance; a premium has been put on retaining
a smart lawyer; but neither of these accomplishments, I submit, can
offset the loss of respect for law which must inevitably follow such
verbal distinctions. The layman will echo the words of the early judge
who said, "If that is the law, the law is an ass"; but being a layman he
is unlikely to go on and say, after the judge, that therefore the law
must be different.
The essential weakness of any objectives test is epitomized by the old
saying, "There's more than one way to skin a cat." Often the difficulty
41 The late Senator Taft objected to more stringent "anti-featherbedding" provisions
on this ground. 93 Cong. Rec. 6598 (1947).
42 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) held the rule unconstitutional.
43 See authorities cited in notes 23 and 28 supra.
44 See authorities cited in note 28 supra.
[Vol. 39
LAW AND LABOR DISPUTES
is inescapable; and it should give pause to anyone who is inclined to
enlarge the legal restrictions on concerted activities in labor disputes.
Sometimes the difficulty can be got over, but only at considerable cost.
A number of courts confronted with the absurd distinction between
picketing for recognition and organizational picketing have acknowl-
edged their equivalence and eliminated the distinction by holding both
unlawful.45 Common sense dictates abolition of the distinction but
thereafter an injunction cannot be supported on the bare ground that
the court, taking its guide from the statute, is merely protecting an
employer against reprisals imposed on him for refusing to commit an
unfair labor practice. Left without guidance, what warrant has a court
for deciding that one group of employees should not be free to use
picketing in protecting their labor standards against competition from
non-union groups?
The question recalls the pre-Norris-LaGuardia Act criticism of the
labor injunction. Judges, it was said, ought not to decide questions
of social and economic policy for which there are no accepted standards.
Thus phrased the criticism is a little too broad; for all law is an ex-
pression of judgments upon questions of policy, most of them social or
economic. Generally speaking, however, the policy-making role of the
judge is limited to deciding little questions by particularizing standards
that have crystallized through general acceptance. The courts may
properly make major shifts of policy only by a series of slight changes
over long periods of time. The fault inherent in judicial intervention
into labor disputes prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was that the courts
were laying down new and major policies in a controversial area without
accepted standards. The practice is no less objectionable today whether
the judicial decision intrudes into organizational conflicts or deals with
issues on the borderline between management's admitted functions and
the familiar subjects of collective bargaining.
This criticism of much judge-made labor law is obviously inapplicable
when the legislature forbids strikes or picketing deemed inconsistent
with the public interest. The legislature is the proper branch of govern-
ment to make such decisions, if the government is to make them. The
union unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are great
improvements over the labor injunction, partly because they are en-
forced by a public agency instead of by private suit, but chiefly because
they substitute a deliberate legislative policy for the varying opinions
of judges. Yet the effectiveness of even a legislative mandate is im-
45 E.g., Tallman Co. v. Latal, 25 CCH Lab. Cas. II 68,207 (Mo. 1954).
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paired by the controversial character of the issues. The reason lies in
a third factor limiting the usefulness of law in labor disputes-the
problems of compliance.
A minor aspect of the inherent difficulty of enforcing laws banning
strikes or picketing is revealed by experience under NLRA Section
8(b) (4) (D), which bans jurisdictional strikes. At the Taft-Hartley
hearings a year ago Mr. John A. Stephens of U. S. Steel Corp. pleaded
for stricter legislation and new remedies on the ground that construction
jobs had been plagued by jurisdictional strikes despite the existing statu-
tory prohibition.46 But passing new laws will not exorcize the problem.
So long as feelings run high on any issue, short stoppages will be in-
evitable however thunderous the legal interdiction or dire the statutory
punishment.
The major aspect of the problem of compliance is not enforcement;
it is more fundamental. In a liberal democracy sanctions can be invoked
only against the occasional wrongdoer. "Government by consent of the
governed" does not mean merely a free vote after which the majority
imposes its will in total disregard of the interests of the minority. The
effectiveness of law depends upon its acceptance by the governed, either
because they approve the policy which it expresses, or because it is
the law.4 7 What can be done by law alone is therefore limited, unless
we are willing increasingly to substitute force for the processes of
persuasion.4"
This limitation upon what can be done by law in a liberal democracy
is peculiarly severe in labor relations. To enforce the law by criminal
sanctions against large numbers of employees is out of the question.
There was, and is, no consensus of opinion about the propriety of many
of labor's objectives or of the weapons with which they are pursued.
In such instances the decision, whether statutory or judge-made, too
obviously involves debatable issues and feelings run too high for it to
command acquiescence just because it is the law.
The difficulty is the more acute in regulating the conduct of employees
because any restriction of the opportunity to strike or picket curtails
a very personal liberty. Since strikes are economic weapons, anti-strike
46 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Proposed
Revision of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 862-863
(1953).
47 Cf. Becker, Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life, pp. 23-25
(1945).
48 The argument must not be pressed too far, else we should have to join with Hayek
in condemning much valuable social and economic legislation.
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laws probably are not subject to attack under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.49 But whether a man works or not, -whether he joins his fellows
in not working or not, are decisions concerning what one does with his
person, however powerful may be the labor organization. And I suspect
that picketing contains more elements of expression, and that in the
end more will be left of the Thornill case,0° than recent commentators
have acknowledged., 1
I have stressed these five characteristics of legal intervention into
labor disputes, which seem to me to limit the usefulness of law, because
the tendency of both judges and legislatures has been to overlook them.
Perhaps this is not always very harmful to industrial relations-most
people have a happy faculty of paying no attention to the worst mistakes
of the lawgivers-but it is harmful to law and therefore impairs still
farther the usefulness of law in situations where law is needed.
For the inherent weaknesses of law in dealing with labor disputes are
only one side of the question. We should err as grievously by exaggerat-
ing them as by minimizing their importance. There is need to prevent
selfish injuries to the public and to protect legitimate businesses against
the harm done by the use of economic weapons to achieve improper
or futile goals. The country has flatly rejected the philosophy that "So
long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and illicit ... are not to be distinguished by any
judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrong-
ness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
union activities are the means."52 We are not likely to return to that
philosophy unless anti-labor forces gather sufficient legislative strength
to enact repressive laws driving the center to an extreme reaction.
Nor do I mean to imply that the law should merely reflect practices
which everyone already observes. The government has enormous power
and must occasionally invoke its sanctions. The struggle on the New
York waterfront had to be fought. Furthermore, when the law embodies
ideals in which society has faith, the codification shapes men's attitudes
even though the sanctions may be imperfect, and thus the law brings the
ideals somewhat closer to realization. In most of the country the im-
position of a statutory duty to bargain in good faith has had that
consequence. 3 LMRA Section 301 is also a good illustration. Actions
49 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); France Packing Co. v. Dailey, 166 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1948).
50 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
51 See Cox, "Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution," 4 Vand. L. Rev. 574 (1951).
52 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1940).
53 61 Stat. 136 § 8(b)(1)(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 148 (Supp. 1953) (Taft-Hartley Act).
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for damages for violation of a collective bargaining agreement will
neither abolish wildcat strikes nor establish sound industrial relations.
In the final analysis employees and their union representatives must
recognize and voluntarily perform the responsibilities which the right
to bargain carries. But even though the judicial process is rarely in-
voked, statutory recognition of the legally binding character of collective
agreements nourishes the free acceptance of their obligations.
In the final analysis, therefore, the development of legal rules of
conduct in labor disputes involves striking a balance-a balance between
the need for regulation and the value of freedom, between what the
law can do and its inherent limitations. One cannot strike a balance
in the abstract. To apply these generalizations would require separate
consideration of concerted activities in each kind of controversy between
labor and management. I shall suggest the line in a moment by discuss-
ing organizational picketing as a concrete illustration, but my principal
plea is for reconsideration of the current trend in both statutes and
judicial decisions. The considerations to which I have adverted lead
me to five conclusions.
First. The courts should be restricted to interpreting and enforcing
legislative decisions banning undesirable forms of concerted activity
and withdrawing any particular objectives from the area of collective
bargaining. The current renaissance of the means and objectives tests
is deplorable. Fortunately, the federal courts have adhered more faith-
fully to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the recent decisions excluding
State intervention into labor disputes in businesses subject to NLRB
jurisdiction may make the State court decisions comparatively unim-
portant."4 The only complete remedy, however, would seem to be re-
vision of the State anti-injunction laws perhaps along the lines of the
Massachusetts Anti-injunction Act of 19 50."5
Second. The difficulties of administering any anti-strike measure
framed in terms of an objectives test must be weighed in the balance.
The caution is especially pertinent in examining anti-featherbedding
amendments.
Third. Any statute which prohibits self-help but provides no solution
to the underlying problem is subject to question. The best illustration
of this objection is the California law forbidding jurisdictional strikes,
which provided no method for resolving controversies over work assign-
ments or questions of representation.
54 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
55 Mass. Act 1950, c. 452.
56 Cal. Labor Code §§ 1115-1118.
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Fourth. It is not enough to conclude that unions ought not to strike
or picket in a given set of circumstances. The law should not intervene
merely because a count of heads would reveal 51 per cent opposed to
such strikes while only 49 per cent would tolerate them. In this respect
NLRA Section 8(b) (4) is thoroughly sound. The points at which it
revives legal intervention into everyday disputes are trivial in com-
parison to those it leaves untouched. Also, the law intrudes, by and
large, only into areas where the overwhelming consensus of opinion con-
demns the unlawful conduct. This is clearly true of violence" and strikes
to compel the commission of unfair labor practices. 58 While the juris-
dictional dispute provisions are faulty,59 there is almost unanimous
agreement upon the wisdom of outlawing the jurisdictional strike. Even
in the field of secondary boycotts, 60 there is quite general agreement
that some secondary boycotts should be forbidden by law; the debate
is over where to draw the line.
Fifth. Wherever possible the law should encourage private machinery
for settling disputes instead of building up governmental sanctions. This
has been both the strength and the weakness of the jurisdictional dis-
pute provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Their enactment strengthened
the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes
in the Building and Construction Industry by forcing the unions to accept
the fact that they were no longer free to engage in private warfare
without regard to the injury inflicted upon neutrals. On the other hand,
the administration of this provision, although intended to be cooperative,
has so completely disregarded the accepted practices of the industry
as to discourage participation in the work of the Joint Board. 1
The importance of encouraging private responsibility also has a bear-
ing upon the current issue concerning the wisdom of requiring strike
votes as suggested in President Eisenhower's recent message to Con-
gress. 2 There are numerous reasons for concluding that to have the
government conduct strike votes would seriously damage labor-manage-
ment relations. The most fundamental objection, in my opinion, is that
the proposal strikes at the heart of collective bargaining by denying
57 61 Stat. 136 § 8(b)(1)(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 148 (Supp. 1953) (Taft-Hartley Act).
58 Ibid., § 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (4) (C).
59 Ibid., § 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k). Hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on Proposed Revision of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2428-2431 (1953).
60 61 Stat. 136 § 8(b)(4) (A) and (B)(1947), 29 U.S.C. 148 (Supp. 1953) (Taft-Hartley
Act).
61 See the testimony cited in note 59 supra.
62 H.R. Doc. No. 291, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1953).
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the union designated as the representative of all the employees in the
bargaining unit the right to make decisions on the most critical of all
issues. When a majority of the employees join a union and thereby
designate it as their bargaining representative, the union is empowered
to act not merely for its members but for all the employees in the unit.
Thereafter it is for the union acting through its constitutional processes
to decide whether to accept or reject the wages, hours and other condi-
tions of employment offered by the employer. To put such questions
to all the employees (as distinguished from the union members) in
the form of a strike vote is to deprive labor unions of their power to act
on behalf of the bargaining unit. The point which I wish to emphasize
here, however, is that if the law must interfere to protect individual
workers from being led into a strike by union officialdom, the law should
be framed in a way that will encourage private democracy within labor
unions. Almost every union constitution provides for a vote of the mem-
bers prior to a strike. In almost every case the votes are fairly con-
ducted.
The supposed evil is the alleged practice of railroading strike votes
through meetings by a voice vote when only a few members are present
or the atmosphere is permeated by fear of violence. In 1947 the Com-
mittee for Economic Development took note of the public interest in
assuring democratic strike votes. It proposed the enactment of legisla-
tion "requiring the approval of any strike action by the majority of
union members voting." The CED thereby recognized the distinction
between a poll of the union members and a poll of all the employees.
The proposal to poll all employees strikes at the heart of collective
bargaining and impugns the democracy of all unions. The CED pro-
posal acknowledges the fundamental principle of collective bargaining-
that the designated representative should decide through its constitu-
tional processes whether to accept the terms of employment offered by
the employer or to strike. It would not affect the great bulk of labor
unions but would correct abuses in those few instances in which union
procedure is not democratic.
If the procedure suggested by CED were thought desirable, it could
easily be embodied in two provisions: First, every local union acting as
exclusive bargaining representative under the NLRA should be required
to take a vote of its members prior to a strike. Second, the NLRB should
be authorized to intervene and supervise the vote only when a petition
was filed by a substantial number of union members showing reasonable
cause to believe that the required vote would not be fairly conducted
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in the absence of government supervision. There would be no need for
NLRB action in other cases.
It is my considered opinion that the occasions on which strikes have
been called without affording union members a fair opportunity to vote
have been so rare as to make legislation unnecessary. Even the CED
proposal involves an interference with the internal affairs of voluntary
associations which cannot be justified by imaginary abuses or isolated
incidents. Nevertheless, the CED proposal is not only preferable to
the President's recommendation, 63 but it is entirely adequate to correct
any evil that may exist.
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to raise one concrete issue con-
cerning the role which law should play in labor disputes. In many States
the rule is fast developing that a labor union may not lawfully picket
an establishment as a means of organizing its employees. Oregon has
enacted a statute forbidding organizational picketing.64 The Missouri
courts have developed a corresponding rule of decision. 5 The lower
New York courts have moved far in this direction66 although it is not
too late for the Court of Appeals to reverse the trend by confining
Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn 7 to the narrow issue actually presented.
In the federal sphere organizational strikes and picketing are generally
held lawful,68 although not without dissent from one judicial circuit;69
but the House Labor Committee has voted to amend the Taft-Hartley
Act to outlaw concerted activities except by a certified bargaining
representative. To make the issue specific, let us inquire whether the
proposal ought to be adopted.
The answer is not as clear as formerly. Prior to the Wagner Act self-
help was the only available countermeasure to discriminatory discharges
and other employer interference. The tactics of revolution were neces-
sary to break the bonds of fear and habit. Today the way is open to all
kinds of organizing techniques, both in the plant and out; and in the
older industrial areas an atmosphere favorable to unionization has been
established. Why should the community continue to suffer the costs of
economic warfare?
It is convenient to break the question down by looking separately at
63 Ibid.
64 See note 27 supra.
65 Tallman Co. v. Latal, 25 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 68,207 (Mo. 1954).
66 See note 28 supra.
67 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
68 Perry Norvel Co., 80 N.L.RJ.. 225 (1948).
69 NLRB v. Capital Service, 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953).
1954]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the interests of the employer, his employees as yet unorganized, the
union, and the public at large.
The employer's chief injury is loss of business. He may also suffer,
though we should not value this interest highly, by having to make con-
cessions to a successful union.
The interests of the employees inside the establishment are harder
to evaluate. They may gain materially through unionization, or they
may not. Their freedom of choice of representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining is certainly affected if they have already joined
another union and if the picketing is effective; for if the picketing is
effective, the only way for them to preserve the business that supplies
their jobs is to change unions in response to the economic coercion. If
the employees do not belong to a union, an effective picket line interferes
with their interest in freedom not to join a union. Ardent unionists may
argue that this freedom should not be valued highly or that reluctance
to join a union is chiefly the product of habit and intimidation by the
employer. For the moment I insist only that wherever we place the
interest in our scale of values, employees sometimes wish not to join-
and have the wish of their own volition.
The competing interests of the outside group are also very real.
Spreading union organization may be the only effective way to protect
the union wage scale and labor standards against the competition of
low cost goods. Strengthening the union by spreading organization is
often prerequisite to further improvement of the conditions of labor.
Even if one with infinite wisdom were to call the effort unjustified, a
society dedicated to a measure of free enterprise must recognize the
interest of the picketing group in freedom of action in the struggle
for self-advancement. Concerted activities which demonstrate the power
of a union may be important not so much because they exert economic
coercion upon the unorganized employees but because they offset the
unorganized employees' fear of running counter to the employer's wishes,
a fear often kept alive and strengthened by the artful use of the privilege
of free speech which NLRA Section 8(c) wisely guarantees employers.
Since the public is not a monolithic State in our society, the public
interest is largely the sum of the private interests already noted. It
should also be observed, however, that the loss attendant upon labor dis-
putes reduces the common wealth and increases the costs of maintaining
public order.
On balance it is clear that once the employees have chosen a repre-
sentative in an NLRB election, the interests injured by further picketing
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by the minority outweigh any possible gains, at least until the time is
ripe for a new test of employee sentiment. NLRA Section 8(b) (4) (C)
embodies substantially this rule.7" There is no serious problem of defin-
ing the kind of action prohibited; evasion is not easy; and an over-
whelming body of opinion supports the legislative judgment.
Section 8(b) (4) (C) ought to be extended, I submit, to cover picket-
ing after the employees have freely voted in an NLRB election not to
be represented by a labor union. The present distinction is justified
only if society values freedom to bargain through representatives of
one's own choosing so much more highly than freedom to reject col-
lective bargaining that it is prepared to allow organized groups in key
industries to use their economic power to attach other appropriate units
as satellites. Although the national labor policy should be one of en-
couragement for collective bargaining, instead of cold indifference, it
ought not to permit such destruction of self-determination.
Until an election has been held, picketing and other concerted activ-
ities ought to be permitted. Drawing a distinction between organiza-
tional picketing and picketing for immediate recognition is futile for
reasons already stated.7' Since the rule must permit or condemn both,
two considerations tip the balance against legal interference. One is
that no one can know the true will of the employees until there has been
an organizational campaign leading up to a government sponsored
election. Second, a prohibition against all organizational picketing could
not command the consent of the governed even though enacted by a
majority in the Congress. Public resentment runs strong against unions
which carry on picketing for ten months, a year or even three years while
they avoid an election because they know that most of the employees
would vote against the union. In drafting the Massachusetts Anti-
injunction Law of 1950 we found, however, that once assurance was
given that minority picketing would be unlawful after an election, there
was wide agreement, even among employers, that picketing ought to be
permissible until the election. Certainly there is no such consensus of
opinion as would lead union men to realize the justice of a more severe
restriction.
In drawing such a line two other minor changes would be necessary.
First, an employer should be permitted to file a petition under NLRA
Section 9 when a union struck or picketed his establishment even though
70 The difference is that Section 8(b) (4) (C) extends the interdiction indefinitely whereas
the suggested rule would permit picketing as soon as the way was open to a new election.
71 See p. 601 supra.
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it made no formal demand for recognition. Second, the union should not
be permitted to evade the election and continue the concerted activities
by disclaiming an interest. A reasonable time, measured chiefly by the
size of the establishment, should be allowed for the election campaign
but thereafter the union should be put to the test of the election or forced
to withdraw its pickets.
